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The October 2011 Solvency II draft introduces the possibility of a countercyclical premium 
(CCP).  Upon  a  declaration  by  EIOPA  (European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions 
Authority) that distressed market conditions exist, an additional wedge is to be added to the 
risk-free term structure to value all insurance liabilities subject to fair market valuation.1  
This measure should reduce balance sheet stress for insurance companies in times of high 
illiquidity and credit spreads.  Such conditions often follow periods of high liquidity and 
compressed risk premia, where asset values are inflated. High volatility of market prices 
implies  high  variability  of  prudential  reserves  for  insurance  companies.  If  some  of  this 
volatility may be considered transitory, insurance regulation should include countercyclical 
features, to parallel macro-prudential measures in banking such as the countercyclical buffer. 
These would help regulate excessive exuberance as well as market panic.  
The  CCP  is  probably  the  most  controversial  and  debated  innovation.  First  and  foremost 
because it matters: a small premium on the discount rate leads to much improved solvency 
ratios (Morgan Stanley & Oliver Wyman, 2012). Second, because its logic is flawed. Third, 
because  it  is  not  countercyclical,  and  may  lead  to  risk-shifting  with  the  banking  system 
across the credit cycle.  
The CCP approach has such evident flaws to require the planning of an early review of 
Solvency II, to be supported by high-level research and consultation. 
The aims of this note are two-fold: 1) to clarify the problem the CCP is meant to address and 
2) to sketch an alternative adjustment based on economic logic.  
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1.  The issue 
Prudential regulators now recognize the need to contain the risk cycle, which manifests itself 
in  liquidity,  credit  and  asset  prices  booms  and  busts.  In  exuberant  times,  liquidity  is 
abundant and asset prices may form bubbles, as risk is underestimated and underpriced. 
This boosts credit, flatters capital ratios and enhances risk incentives. In times of distress, 
assets become illiquid and may become underpriced, creating the reverse effects. 
Excessive volatility2 has consequences. In hard times it may lead to bank runs and fire sales, 
while producing sharp drops in insurer capital reserves under market-consistent valuation.  
In addition, after a major crisis such as nowadays, insurers’ balance sheets further suffer as 
monetary  intervention  to  avoid  fire  sales  depresses  riskless  rates.  These  have  a 
disproportionate  impact  on  long  term  insurance  liabilities,  forcing  potentially  excessive 
capital adjustment. 
Macro  prudential  policy  requires  a  delicate  judgment  on  the stage  of  the  risk  cycle.  The 
specific tool adopted under Basel III are countercyclical reserves. It creates financial buffers 
for banks in good times, which may be run down in distress times.  
The draft Solvency II Level 2 text includes proposals of a matching premium and CCP. The 
parallel introduction of these principles will have consequences for risk allocation along the 
risk cycle and across the insurance and banking sectors.  
The matching premium and CCP under Solvency II create an accounting buffer for insurers. 
While some adjustment is at times justifiable, the approach is flawed. There is no economic 
logic in discounting unconditional promises at a risk premium.  
By  manipulating  the  reported  value  of  liabilities,  arbitrary  discounting  enables  opaque 
concessionary adjustments which escape scrutiny. 
Discounting liabilities 
The language of insurance regulation has been upset by the introduction of the so-called 
“illiquidity  premium”  in  Solvency  II’s  QIS  5,  which  was  rapidly  renamed  “matching 
premium” and then finally “matching adjustment”. The design of the CCP arises from this 
concept. 
Adjustments to the risk-free term structure have no historical precedent in insurance. The 
use of discounting liabilities comes from a UK accounting practice of matched portfolios. 
Credit  risk-adjusted  assets  were  dedicated  to  fund  long-term  unredeemable  liabilities 
deemed  highly  predictable  (annuities,  pensions).  This  is  mathematically  equivalent  to 
discount liabilities at the expected rate of return on assets.  
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Figure 1. Balance sheet resource requirements are highly sensitive to the illiquidity premium (IP) 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Research and Oliver Wyman. 
Simply put: it does not make economic sense to discount fixed insurance promises at a risk 
premium:  their  amount  should  be  treated  as  unconditional,  and  thus  discounted  at  the 
riskless rate (certainly for the sake of computing prudential reserves!).  
The extraordinary step of adopting such a flawed valuation adjustment has been noted by 
the top industry specialists. In their 2012 review of Solvency II, Morgan Stanley and Oliver 
Wyman candidly state: 
Initially discarded entirely by almost anyone except the UK annuity writers, it has 
now become accepted as an important element of the future design of the Solvency 2 
framework. In particular, this is because it can reduce the capital requirement for 
spread volatility. 
Only under heroic assumptions (guaranteeing exactly matched cash flows at no transaction 
costs, with all asset and liability risk perfectly hedged), the required reserve is the same as 
under an illiquidity or matching premium. Yet a perfectly replicating portfolio simply does 
not  exist  due  to  the  inherent  unhedgeable  nature  of  insurance  liabilities.3  Moreover, 
valuation in this context is based on a hold-to-maturity principle, conceptually at odds with 
market-consistent (transfer or settlement) valuation principles of Solvency II.  
It  is  true  that  illiquid  assets  carry  an  illiquidity  premium,  which,  if  held  to  maturity, 
disappears.  (Incidentally,  it  is  very  hard  to  separate  from  credit  risk.)  But  the  illiquidity 
premium is an adjustment to asset values, not liabilities. The fact that insurers’ assets may 
earn this illiquidity premium thanks to long-term liabilities may enhance the long-term value 
of  their  investment.  There  is  no  reason  why  it ought  to  reduce  the  present value  of  the 
liabilities.  
In a narrowly defined application, dedicated or matched portfolios may be tolerated as a 
short cut with limited risks. But this tolerance should not extend to validate the discounting 
insurance promises at some risk premium as a fundamental valuation procedure, in the face 
of uniform academic disagreement.4 
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inflation, and long term promises for which there are no assets of matching maturity.  
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Yet this flawed approach has now been generalized by the introduction of the countercyclical 
premium, designed to discount liabilities not subject to a matching premium in times of 
distress.  
The CCP approach 
We summarize below the main flaws inherent in the CCP approach: 
  Applying  a  fudge  discount  rate  to  discount  insurance  liabilities  such  as  the  CCP 
decreases the transparency and rigor of insurance regulation. It flatters the valuation of 
technical reserves, blurring scrutiny on the soundness and performance of the industry. 
This is troublesome as Solvency II was meant to increase transparency.  
  The hold-to-maturity principle is at odds with market-consistent valuation.   
  The CCP is not countercyclical. In periods of financial stress, it reduces balance sheet 
stress  for  insurance  companies,  yet  in  times  of  excessive  exuberance  no  prudential 
buffers are built up (even though in this case asset prices are in fact too high).  
  Since Basel III introduces a symmetric macro-prudential tool via countercyclical buffers, 
the  misalignment  created  by  an  asymmetric  CCP  may  induce  risk-shifting  from  the 
banking to the insurance sector in a credit expansion phase. 
  To the extent that intervention becomes predictable, it will be anticipated in individual 
investment choices.  
  Leniency  in  downturns  gives  risk  herding  incentives  to  the  EU  insurance  industry, 
leading to correlated investment strategies. 
  Applying  the CCP  crucially  relies  on  a  proper assessment  of  the  risk  cycle,  a highly 
challenging  econometric  exercise.  EIOPA  does  not  appear  equipped  at  present  to 
perform  such  a  task,  and  it  should  not  be  empowered  to  declare  publicly  a  state  of 
“systemic” distress. There is no proper operational procedure underlying the CCP in its 
current form and high-level research on the issue is urgently required. 
  Explicit advice by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been included in later 
versions  as  critical  for  calling  the  state  of  distress.  Yet  there  has  been  no  proper 
consultation  with  the  ESRB  (or  for  that matter, with  the scientific  community)  in  the 
elaboration of Solvency II. 
  Finally, the industry has strongly argued that the call of the CCP should be formularized. 
While predictability is a plus, it is clear that declaring collective distress should require 
extraordinary circumstances, in which discretionarity is important.  
2.  A consistent response: Countercyclical buffers 
Some form of capital relief may be justified for insurers in exceptional distress phases, if risk 
premia on less liquid assets are expected to partially revert to more normal levels in due 
time.  Some  leeway  is  particularly  reasonable  when  riskless  rates  are  also  depressed  by 
emergency monetary expansion. This is not primarily, as some claim, to avoid fire sales, as 
less capitalized insurers would not (unlike banks) easily be forced into fire sales.   
It is impossible to rapidly formulate a well thought-through alternative to the CCP. Solvency 
II must introduce an early review process to evaluate these extraordinary measures. But it is 
possible to spell out some of the necessary ingredients of a sensible solution.  COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION IN SOLVENCY II | 5 
 
A proper adjustment to excessive market volatility should primarily be focused on asset 
valuation. It would involve the creation of precautionary buffers in insurance regulation, just 
as in Basel III.  
This policy would enable tolerating lower solvency ratios in distress time but would also 
avoid excessive distribution of capital to shareholders and beneficiaries in booms. 
After all, recognizing excessive volatility implies that asset prices also become inflated in 
boom  times.  A  balanced  policy  would  be  justifiable  on  macro-  and  micro-prudential 
arguments. 
A simple approach would be to have three ‘policy phases’. Next to a normal phase, when 
market  valuation should  be  the  norm,  there  should  be  a  boom  phase  calling  for  reserve 
accumulation, and a distress phase when buffers may be run down.  
Implementation of any countercyclical tool is fraught with delicate issues of assessment of 
the risk cycle.  Alternatively, a transition path may be designed to recover reserve ratios over 
some period, adjusting the ladder of intervention.  
The degree of relief (such as the time of recovery) should be based on the percentage of long 
term liabilities in the balance sheet. Intuitively, insurers with more long term (unredeemable) 
obligations have more time to weather the transition to ‘normal’ risk premia. Otherwise, any 
capital ratio concession in distress time would unduly favour short-term insurance policies, 
and distort industry choices. 
Deviations from the ‘normal’ phase should be recognized as being temporary. Furthermore, 
the principles determining the timing and degree of deviation should be regularly reviewed. 
The extent of leeway offered should be eventually based on high-level research. 
3.  Conclusions 
Solvency  II  was  meant  to  introduce  market  valuation  as  a  foundation  for  insurance 
regulation and was vigorously supported by the industry in the boom. It is now evident that 
asset prices go through phases of overconfidence as well as extreme risk avoidance. To the 
extent that this results in temporary volatility, market-consistent valuation induces excessive 
volatility  in  solvency  ratios  for  insurers  with  matched  long-term  liabilities.  Solvency  II 
should introduce measures recognizing the possibility of temporary adjustments in required 
solvency ratios, to facilitate carrying matched long-term promises. However, the road chosen 
is a form of creative accounting via arbitrary discounting of liabilities, hiding their real value, 
rather than recognizing the issues where they lie, namely on the asset valuation side.  
The proposed CCP adjustment defines a valuation concept with no economic foundations, 
and  thus  one  that  is  easily  manipulated.  It  even  fails  to  be  countercyclical,  as  it  adjusts 
reserve  requirements  only  in  distress.  We  call  instead  for  a  fully  countercyclical  buffer 
approach, consistent with the Basel III approach, which would avoid risk-shifting from the 
banking to the insurance industry over the cycle.  
There is essentially unanimity of views in the academic community on these issues. An early 
rather than late review of the Solvency II regulation is indispensable. 
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